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EU Energy Policy and Regional Co-operation in South-East 
Europe: managing energy security through diversification of 
supply? 
 
Diana Bozhilova# 
ABSTRACT 
For decades after founding the ECSC (1951) the member states have 
relegated the issue of joint supranational energy policy development. 
The situation changed decisively in the early 1990s, with the 
dramatic shift in the geo-politics of the resource-rich Eurasia, 
following such developments as the collapse of the USSR and the 
Gulf War. In light of these developments, European states gradually 
consolidated their position in favour of supranational energy policy 
development. This paper presents an analysis of developments in EU 
energy policy given the ongoing realignment of strategic interest. It 
outlines the process of Europeanization, identifying caveats in the 
security of energy supply. It then proposes a solution to the main 
problematic of diversification of hydrocarbons supply through the 
fostering of regional co-operation amongst the states of South-East 
Europe (mainly Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey). The paper argues 
that this is the only viable and lasting solution to EU energy 
dependency away from Russia, at once showing the fundamental 
importance of pipeline ‘mapping’ in the area. 
 
Keywords: Energy, Regional Co-operation, Europeanization, Transmission 
Pipelines. 
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EU Energy Policy and Regional Co-operation in South-East 
Europe: managing energy security through diversification of 
supply? 
 
1. Introduction 
Up until around 1990 the member states of the European Economic 
Community (EEC/EC) overwhelmingly considered decision-making in energy 
policy as best served by national governments. Then, the recession of the early 
1990s led to a sea change. Observing this shift begs two fundamental questions: 
(1) what framework conditions influence the causality between economic 
growth and energy consumption, and (2) how can we control for them?  
Distance, in the first instance, became the salient variable in the energy 
equation. Europe’s geographic remoteness from proven reserves of fossil fuels 
has threatened the pricing system. It has burdened the consumer, breaking 
down consumption volumes.1 Yet, distance is a strictly exogenous variable that 
cannot be mitigated by policy. Next, trade as an independent policy variable, 
was expected to allay both the increased conflict brought about by geographic 
proximity and the effects of distance in diminishing cooperation (Robst et al, 
2006). The critical issue in respect of energy resources is that although trade 
may mitigate violent conflict since exporting and importing states are further a 
distance from one another, in actual fact it may also lead to an increase of non-
                                                 
1
 Fossil fuels provide around 66% of world's total electrical power and 95% of world's 
total energy demands (including heating, transport, electricity generation, etc) 
(Conseil Mondial de l’Energie, 2008). 
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violent conflict due to trade agreement disputes. Recent examples abound: 
Turkey in 2003, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2009.  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, both considerations of 
distance and trade have led European states to ponder anxiously on the 
sustainability of domestic economic growth. Exogenous considerations, too, 
such as foreign policy developments have weighted in significantly since 1990 
towards supranational energy policy regulation. The production of oil, gas and 
coal is limited to today’s reserves. On the one hand, that is the fraction of the 
resources that can be extracted at economic costs. On the other, it is an estimate 
of reserves that can be found in the future. Both market imperfections and 
technical limitations to production rates slow market adjustments to changes in 
expected prices or costs (Brown, 1989). The more production grows bound to 
off-shore exploration, the less realistic the estimate and the more costly the 
extraction. As a result major projects have already backfired with spectacular 
aplomb (Sakhalin II and the Caspian Basin). Technological investment as a 
policy variable has come to the fore in European Union (EU) energy policy-
making (Pöttering, 2009).  
In its subsequent sections this paper explores the varying degrees of success 
with which energy policy-making in the EU is carried out. It offers an analysis 
of recent developments by firstly identifying the main caveats in energy supply, 
demand, and security, establishing a crucial link to industrial production 
capabilities. Second, it discusses the merits of the process of Europeanization in 
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this arena. Finally, the paper proposes that a solution to the security of supply is 
to be found neither at the supranational, nor at the national level. A middling 
path between unilateral action and supranational authority emerges in the 
fostering of strong regional co-operation amongst neighbouring transmission 
countries. The contention stands where there is either no alternative to regional 
co-operation or any existing alternative would be so costly that it would 
become inefficient.  
This perspective is exemplified in two geographic dimensions. First, the 
Northern dimension, namely the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline (Yamal I & II) 
versus Nord Stream. Second, the Southern dimension: Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum, 
Turkey-Greece-Italy, and Nabucco versus Blue Stream (I & II) and South 
Stream. The Northern dimension has been subject to prior discourse (Hubert, 
2007; Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2007). Applying co-operative game theory leads 
to the conclusion that Nord Stream will be more expensive than the Yamal 
pipeline. However, this is counterbalanced by the fact that the cost and security 
of supply is dramatically improved. Likewise, the Southern dimension has 
recently received heightened attention. It ties together Greece, Bulgaria and 
Turkey in a historically unlikely partnership as key European transmission 
states. However, the transmission routes have remained under-explored thus far 
due to the decades-long geographic isolation of the region. In addition, the 
number, complexity and potential of the projects are superior to anything else 
proposed on the continent to-date. A further obstacle is the geo-political 
constellations in its immediate vicinity. Energy policy is often wielded as an 
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instrument of foreign policy by resource-rich states. As a result, it often falls 
captive to issues pertaining to conflict resolution, minority rights, territorial 
integrity, and extremism. The probability of project completion diminishes as 
such instances grow pronounced.  
By exploring the maze of endogenous considerations and exogenous 
interdependencies, this paper shows that regional co-operation amongst the 
states of South-East Europe (SEE) is the only viable and long-lasting solution 
to the overarching EU energy policy problematic of diversification of the origin 
of fossil fuel supply to the continent. Two central arguments support this 
statement. First, SEE lies in the immediate vicinity of more than 70% of the 
world’s proven gas (and oil) reserves. This has a positive effect on transmission 
costs by reducing the negative effects of distance. Second, the location of 
Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in relation to one another allows for the building 
up of different constellations of transmission coalitions. This provides for a 
diversification of the indigenous import locations. Bringing Turkey into the 
process both through regional co-operation and the EU integration process has 
led to an improvement in the security outlook of the transmission projects in 
the region. This is still conditioned on Turkey seeing itself as a potential 
‘insider’ rather than an ‘outsider’ over the long term. In this sense, regional co-
operation can be the key to balancing out the possibility that Turkey may use 
energy policy as a trumpet card in the accession process, disrupting resource 
supply to the EU area. Therefore, regional co-operation in SEE serves a dual 
purpose: political stabilization and economic prosperity for the continent. 
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2. Industrial production and energy demand in the European Union 
Energy and economic growth are intrinsically linked. Sustainable development 
is dependent upon a secure and reliable energy supply. Physical theory dictates 
that energy is required for economic production and therefore growth. Yet, 
mainstream theory of economic growth often overlooks this critical juncture 
(Stern and Cleveland, 2004). Stern and Cleveland are not alone in this 
argument. More growth requires more energy and more energy allows for 
further growth according to recent research by Gales et al. (2007). The 
conclusion is sustained not only throughout the stage of industrialisation but 
also in the post-industrialisation period. Although it is said that energy intensity 
increases during industrialisation and declines thereafter, empirical research in 
economic history has shown that one needs to treat this assumption rather 
sceptically. The hypothesis stands in respect of the economies of the major 
developing countries, the BRICs. However, within the post-industrialised 
economies of the EU-27, the widening share of services has not necessarily 
brought about any significant relative decline in energy intensity. The empirical 
findings in Table 1 show that energy used per unit of economic output has 
declined. Yet, this is to a large extent due to a shift in the energy mix from 
direct use of mineral fuels, such as coal, to the use of higher quality fossil fuels, 
such as gas, and especially electricity. When theory and empirical results are 
taken into consideration the prospect for further large reductions in the energy 
intensity of economic activity seems limited. 
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Table 1: Energy Indicators, EU-27 aggregated 
Year Energy Intensity (toe/MEUR) 
Carbon Intensity 
(tonne CO2/toe) 
GIC per capita 
(kgoe/inh.) 
CO2 emission per 
capita (kg/inh.) 
1990 231.4 2.78 3498 9732 
1991 227.5 2.73 3492 9541 
1992 220.1 2.71 3409 9225 
1993 215.4 2.66 3397 9039 
1994 208.3 2.67 3376 9011 
1995 207.9 2.63 3454 9094 
1996 211.1 2.62 3566 9343 
1997 203.7 2.60 3528 9166 
1998 199.9 2.57 3560 9152 
1999 192.6 2.55 3527 8988 
2000 186.9 2.55 3548 9037 
2001 187.3 2.54 3619 9185 
2002 184.5 2.54 3597 9124 
2003 186.8 2.54 3674 9319 
2004 184.5 2.52 3702 9372 
2005 181.6 2.51 3692 9259 
Source: European Commission, Statistical yearbook 2007/8. 
When the data from Table 1 is compared to the decomposition of energy 
intensity, it becomes clear that the exponential growth of the services sector as 
total share of the economy represents a very small fraction of total change in 
energy intensity. The change is in the region of 10-15% for the period 1970-
2000. This is an outcome of the growth of services fractioned as the decline 
deriving from the change in GDP composition. Instead, the change in energy 
intensity is mostly accounted for by superior technological efficiency in 
industrial production. Thus, for the economies of the EU member states to 
sustain growth in the new millennium two prerequisites are essential: (1) 
investment in innovation and (2) security of energy supply.  
These objectives are consistent with the findings of the Enterprise Directorate-
General of the European Commission (Navarro, 2003). At the core is the 
promotion of European industrial competitiveness vis-à-vis third countries 
(Woolcock and Wallace, 1995). As a result a chapter on industry was written 
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into title XIII of the Maastricht Treaty. Its contents ask that the member states 
“ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the 
Community’s industry exist” (TEU, Title II).  
At a conceptual level this approach can be summed up in the ideas of 
evolutionary economics, advanced most recently by Nelson and Winter (1982). 
They do away with the neo-classical approach of the state’s pre-emptive role to 
market disruption that centres on strategic trade and infant-industry policies. 
Strategic trade policies refer to strategic industries’ oligopolistic companies, 
which realize high profits, or ‘national champions’. Central governments may 
take the ‘strategic’ view in favour of sustaining their dominant position in order 
to retain the profits of large companies within the national boundaries of the 
state. However, when competition takes place on an integrated EU-wide scale, 
national regulatory authorities can no longer effectively control the activities of 
domestic companies.  
Notwithstanding, national champions are not above receiving support from 
their governments, even where they operate across the wider EU market. This 
calls for EC controls over and scrutiny of national subsidies to an extent far 
greater than ever before. Without significant degrees of discipline one-time 
national champions could well distort free market competition. This could 
bring pressure on national governments to provide them with further support by 
deflecting vital domestic investments from elsewhere (Woolcock and Wallace, 
1995).  
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Related further to this problematic, infant-industry policies explain government 
interventionism in industries permeated by new companies, for which the 
governments would argue the high costs of setting up and learning justifies a 
protectionist approach in their early life. In such cases, the government strives 
to reduce negative externalities on these companies by subsidizing their 
national production.  
Since the 1990s, the Commission has sought to uproot both approaches. The 
maturity of the single market leads to a necessity for openness to stimulate 
competition and increase technological development and productivity. In turn, 
this should provide for more and continued prosperity in the EU. Inefficient 
supply allocation was a major issue with strategic trade policies that occurred 
in closed industries. Inputs and outputs were poorly managed (Ving and 
Boardman, 1992). Importantly, inefficient supply allocation led to non-viable 
industry interdependencies. This is the broad view of the situation in EC 
member states as they entered a downturn in the period 1987-1992.  
The EC realised that industries had grown poorly equipped to face the 
competitive pressures emanating from the process of globalization. This 
necessitated the development of a new industrial approach. Its main threads 
centred on aiding in the accomplishment of technological efficiency and the 
reduction of energy intensity for industrial production. In reality, this approach 
was primarily manifested in large volumes of mergers and acquisitions Given 
the current exigencies on growth, it is clear that this approach is unsustainable 
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to render policy objectives complete in the long term. Therefore, a departure 
from entrenched views in respect of industrial growth and energy security 
becomes necessary.  
Responding to such criticism the Directorate General for Energy and Transport 
commissioned an in-depth study into the long-term energy outlook of the EU-
27. It estimated that energy requirements would continue to increase up to 2030 
despite the decline in the energy intensity index hitherto (Table 1). 
Consumption is expected to stabilize after 2020 on account of two major 
factors: (1) lower projected economic growth in the EU-27 for the period, and 
(2) stagnating populations between 2020 and 2030. Total growth in energy 
consumption by 2030 is anticipated to reach 11%, which is much lower than 
expected total GDP growth over the same period (71%). Thus energy intensity 
is expected to continue to decline by 1.7% p.a. This is accounted for by a 
further structural reorientation of the EU economies towards the services sector 
and the light industry. Crucial for the analysis of this paper is the fact that the 
total projected increase in energy consumption by 2030 is to be bourn out 
entirely by a widening of the share of natural gas and renewables in the total 
energy consumption mix, which is shown in Graph 1. Import dependency on 
primary resources will also rise by 2030 to reach 67%, up 14% on current 
import levels. Amongst resources, oil import dependency will be the highest at 
95% by 2030 and gas import dependency will grow from 58% today to 84% in 
twenty years’ time. 
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Graph 1: Primary Energy Requirements by Fuel, 1990-2030, Mtoe 
 
Source: DG Energy and Transport (04/2008). 
 
By 2030 developing economies will be the dominant energy consumers as their 
total consumption would have more than trebled on levels measured in 2001. 
Conversely, data for Europe-OECD shows a much more modest growth in 
consumption, which as total share will be declining year-on-year till 2030. 
Energy efficiency is thought to increase progressively over the period for all 
states except for the CIS countries for which the current starting point of 
consumption is very modest. Total energy production will need to increase by 
at least 7,000 Mtoe by 2030 on 2001 levels to meet projected needs, which 
coupled with peaks in fields in the North Sea and the Russian Federation 
presents states with a profound challenge to secure supplies for the four major 
energy consumers: industry, transport, households, and services.  
Considering the enormity of the outlook, EU member states need to grasp the 
much higher competition in the future for energy resources from developing 
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countries than has been the case hitherto. Determinants on EU energy policy 
should also be born in mind, namely that the EU has no choice but to import 
energy resources from the Russian Federation. However, the latter has a far 
greater choice where to export its reserves to. In addition to the EU market, the 
Russian Federation can trade with the large consumers of Asia, such as China 
and India. Even if the European market pays the highest prices per energy unit 
today, the geo-political situation presents OAO Gazprom with a choice that the 
EU importing companies simply do not have. Furthermore, the EU failed to 
class energy as strategic policy in the years since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This left investment projects without important backing. The private 
sector alone was unsuccessful in extending the transmission networks into 
Europe. Meanwhile, the Russian state was very successful in taking up where 
the EU left over. It secured long-term contracts for oil and gas imports from the 
Caspian littoral states. These are sold today at a significant premium on EU 
markets.  
Thus, the EU lost twice over. First it forewent the possibility to build 
infrastructure to diversify away from OAO Gazprom towards the Caspian. 
Second, it perished by missing the chance to reduce energy costs by 
engineering greater competition in the origin of supply. By failing to invest in 
transmission networks, the EU let the initiative slip from its authority and lost 
political clout in Asia Minor. Not being able to speak with one voice in energy 
negotiations has left the EU member states each vying for its own interest with 
Germany, Italy and Austria at the fore from amongst the more affluent of the 
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members, and Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey as the most eager each to project 
an image as an energy hub for Europe. Recent political developments have 
shown that time spent in the pursuit of diverging and to a significant extent 
self-sufficient national interests is all but time lost. Given this, how do we then 
conceptualize an energy policy for the EU? The following section offers some 
answers from a historical perspective. 
 
3. What kind of energy policy for the European Union? 
A comprehensive energy policy for the EU took a long time to emerge in 
earnest. Broadly five stages in the EU energy policy-making process can be 
discerned. First, in the period 1945-1957, although energy was perceived of as 
a major problem facing the founding six member states of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), energy production was in fact mostly reliant on 
indigenous coal supplies. The establishment of the ECSC served to secure coal 
exploration for industrial purposes whereby supranational co-operation ensured 
development without warfare. This resulted in spill-over effects towards further 
economic and political integration but no major developments in supranational 
energy regulation.  
Second, between 1957 and 1972, energy continued to be seen as an issue of 
lesser concern. Indigenous coal dependence was supplemented and gradually 
replaced by oil. The oil was imported at very cheap prices primarily from the 
Arab producing countries (OAPEC). Given the low costs, energy policy did not 
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climb up the policy-making agenda of the member states during this time 
either. As before, the advancement of European integration in this period did 
not lead to significant spill-over effects into supranational energy policy co-
operation.  
The status quo incurred a dramatic review following the Yom Kippur War and 
the ensuing oil embargo. The outbreak of warfare in the Middle East 
compounded the 1973-74 world stock market crush. As a result of the sudden 
dramatic upsurge in oil prices, energy policy-making re-entered the EC agenda 
for a lasting period up until 1985, marking the end of the third stage (Andersen, 
2000). The collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of warfare in the 
Middle East appeared to both engender new opportunities and revive old fears 
in the 1990s. The attempt of the European Commission to revitalize a common 
EU policy for energy marks the fourth stage in policy development. Here, there 
are overdue signs of a more comprehensive energy policy for the EU. A lasting 
impediment was finally overcome. The strong conflict amongst the member 
states concerning the substance of a common energy policy was mitigated. The 
process of liberalization and integration of national energy grids began, as did 
the unbundling of vertically integrated national companies. Come the new 
millennium, we can speak of the beginning of the fifth stage in EU energy 
policy-making. It is dominated by high oil and gas prices, as well as increasing 
demand for oil and gas imports globally sustained by rapid industrial growth in 
the developing countries. This means that member states more than ever before 
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need to overcome entrenched national security fears and work together to 
project a united front vis-à-vis exporting partner states. 
Enacting legislation for the EU-wide energy market has been a complex and 
tedious task. One of the most difficult regulations occurred in the gas sector, in 
particular concerning transit rights (Stern, 1992). The proposal to 
fundamentally alter the relationship between suppliers, transmission operators, 
distributors, and consumers had to be significantly downgraded before it was 
passed. The crux of the issue centered around three matters in particular: (1) the 
abolition of exclusive rights in relation to the building of gas transmission 
lines; (2) the inscribing of an obligation for vertically integrated companies to 
unbundle their accounting and management systems; (3) the introduction of 
third-party access rights to a limited number of high volume gas consumers, so 
that they could chose suppliers from throughout the community (Lyons, 1994).  
The major opponents to these proposals were in the first instance the larger of 
the EU member states with the exception of the United Kingdom. This was 
possible because energy was not covered by the Treaty of Rome (1958) and 
depending on definition it befits the ambit of both unanimity and majority 
voting rules of decision-making (Art. 100a). The squabble led to a deadlock in 
the Council. The process became precarious and a number of watered down 
proposals, as listed in Table 2, were accepted. 
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Table 2: Most Important EU Energy Legislation in Natural Gas 
Legislation Type Field Scope Other 
2003/55/EC Directive, 
EP and 
Council 
Natural Gas 
Production: from 
upstream to 
downstream 
activities 
1. Subsidiarity; 2. Gas sector 
undertakings; 3. Consumer 
protection; 4. Social and 
economic cohesion and 
environmental protection; 5. 
Derogation; 6. Distribution and 
supply; 7. Right of access to 
accounts; 8. Third-party access; 
9. Force Major;   
Repeals Directive 
98/30/EC; 
Deadline for 
opening of gas 
markets amongst 
EU MS: 
01/01/2007 
1775/2005 Regulation, 
EP and 
Council 
Natural Gas 
Transmission 
Networks 
1. Tariffs; 2. Third-part access; 
3. Maximum capacity allocation 
mechanism; 4. Trading of 
capacity rights;  
Applicable from 
01/01/2007 
2004/67/EC Council 
Directive 
Security of 
Natural Gas 
Supply 
1. Disruption; 2. Monitoring; 3. 
National emergency measures; 
4. Gas coordination group and 
the community mechanism 
In force since 
2004 
Source: Own representation. 
 
These legislative measures show that a gradual approach with long transition 
periods has settled in. More radical proposals from the European Commission 
were abandoned in a process that saw the proponent of the EU vision squared 
against the strong vested national interests of the individual member states. A 
coup for the Commission was a compromise whereby overarching decisions 
relating to the gas market were to be taken at EU level whilst member states 
stayed in charge of the speed and effectiveness of the implementation process. 
To this end two principal avenues for sectoral governance were established, 
namely the Florence Forum for Electricity (1998) and the Madrid Forum for 
Gas (1999), chaired by the Commission. The Commission further set its focus 
on two issues intrinsic to downstream energy policy: (1) the ratification of 
cross-border electricity and gas flows; and (2) the allocation and management 
of scarce interconnection capacities between national transmission systems. To 
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achieve these the Commission made use of five instruments: (1) antitrust law 
(Art. 81); (2) abuse of dominant position (Art. 82); (3) monopoly rights (Art. 
86); (4) merger controls (Regulation No 139/2004); (5) state aid controls (Art. 
87 and Art. 88). Through the creation of markets, that is liberalization, and 
through the integration of markets, that is Europeanization, the following 
objectives may be achieved in the future: (1) improvement of adequate energy 
supply in cases of system failure; (2) improvement of the load-base curve as 
electricity fluctuates on a seasonal basis; (3) decisions are taken in respect of 
the storage of electricity cheaply, the simultaneous consumption of electricity, 
and the trade of electricity; (4) questions of ownership, barriers to entry and 
exit, controls over tariffs, distribution and transmission, as well as scope and 
depth of planning can be discussed and resolved; (5) costs of leveling the field 
between old and new member states can be mitigated (Levi-Faur, 1999).  
The process of EU energy policy development has revealed a number of 
caveats. First, it demonstrated the constraints on the powers of the 
Commission. Second, the process showed the sensitivity of supranational co-
operation in energy. Third, it demonstrated the lack of concerted action 
amongst the EU member states for many decades. The sum of these failings has 
pointed out to a critical lesson for the EU. It is of fundamental importance to 
create a level-playing field between net energy importing states and net energy 
exporting countries for the security of energy supply and sustainable economic 
growth.  
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This can be achieved through a variety of policy instruments. First, by tying 
energy policy to the internal market programme, with competition playing a 
major role in the liberalization of national energy grids. Second, by relating 
energy policy to the attempts of the EU to establish a common environmental 
policy with fiscal measures as its key instrument. Third, by establishing the EU 
Energy Charter Treaty and the EU Energy Charter (1994) that supports reforms 
in the former Eastern Block in an attempt to secure the EU energy supply. 
Their aim is to create a controlled environment that mitigates risks associated 
with energy-related investments and trade.  
The commitment of the Energy Charter Treaty is de jure impressive. Its 
credibility stems from the number and diversity of its signatories, which 
include fifty one states in addition to the EC and Euratom. It represents the EU-
27 member states, other European states, as well as the states of the Caucasus 
in a legally binding multilateral arrangement. Yet, as a policy-making 
instrument it has proven largely ineffective in that the single key player in EU 
energy security, namely the Russian Federation, albeit a member of the Energy 
Charter Conference, has not ratified the treaty to-date. The treaty, therefore, has 
no legally binding force in respect of the Russian Federation. It is also highly 
unlikely that the Russian Federation would ever ratify it, for the following 
reasons.  
Acceding to the Charter Treaty would bind the Russian Federation to an 
obligation to liberalize its energy market. A liberalization of the Russian energy 
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market would allow for domestic and foreign companies to compete with the 
state-controlled OAO Gazprom directly, in which the state controls 51% of all 
shares. This would lead to the loss of significant revenue. Current OAO 
Gazprom contribution to GDP stands at 8% and 20% of the federal budget. 
OAO Gazprom controls the most proven gas reserves world-wide, which is the 
equivalent to some 17% of world proven gas reserves.2 It is Europe’s largest 
supplier of gas. It accounts for 25% of total gas consumption in the EU and 
45.1% of total gas imports into the EU-27. The EU-27 relies on gas imports for 
57.6% of its total consumption needs, a figure set to rise to over 65% by 2030. 
After oil, which caters for 36.9% of the energy needs of the EU-27, gas is the 
second largest source of energy with 24.5% of total Gross Inland Consumption 
(DG Transport and Energy, 2008). The fact that the Russian Federation has not 
acceded to the European Energy Charter Treaty threatens the security of supply 
to EU markets. This is further compounded by the transport system that makes 
access to supplies possible. 
Natural gas is carried through the major gas pipeline routes from West Siberian 
gas fields to West European gas markets that run through the Ukraine. 
Following the first dispute between the Russian Federation and Ukraine over 
price levels and transit rights in 2007, OAO Gazprom undertook a number of 
parallel projects in order to diversify and secure the access of Western 
                                                 
2
 Yet, this is only 60% of Russian proven gas reserves, discounting untapped reserves 
in the Sakhalin and Eastern Siberia. 
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European markets to gas, bypassing Ukraine.3 While the study has produced 
clear outcomes, it is uncertain in the current economic climate where fuel 
prices are sliding how quickly construction of the proposed projects could 
begin. The viability of project construction to transmit gas to Europe has 
already benefited from some independent analysis (Hubert, 2007). It includes 
the projects at Yamal I and Yamal II, Blue Stream, Nord Stream and South 
Stream to carry gas from the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district and the Yamal 
Peninsula, Russia’s largest known untapped gas reserves. These new routes and 
pipelines have been especially rendered necessary after the collapse of the 
former USSR when critical Soviet transmission pipelines found themselves in 
ownership of the newly independent republics. However, with so many costly 
projects under consideration, the Russian Federation needs to continue the 
exploration of new fields in order to ensure constant levels of gas supplied 
under its existing long-term trade contracts with the EU member states. Yet, if 
the Russian Federation acceded to the Energy Charter Treaty, it would have to 
conduct geological exploration with great attention to environmental 
conservation and the impact of such activities on indigenous populations and 
wild life. This would rack in exorbitant costs that are much higher than OAO 
Gazprom currently allocates to exploration undertakings. Thus, many of the 
profits that OAO Gazprom now reaps would have to be re-invested over a long 
period of time, necessarily reducing the size of its federal budgetary 
contribution. The reduction can be of a much more severe order if oil and 
                                                 
3
 Routes through the Ukraine supply ca. 80% of OAO Gazprom gas to the EU and ca. 
40% of total EU gas supplies at the moment (Inogate). 
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following on these, gas prices too, fall further on the trading floors due to fears 
of deepening recession and a slow down in growth world-wide, prompting even 
speculation of depression. The Russian state stands to lose billions of rubles.  
Even if price levels were to return to the record highs seen in early 2008, 
internal accruals from the activities of OAO Gazprom alone are unlikely to be 
sufficient to cover for the associated costs of exploration, given the very 
difficult terrains of the untapped fields, such as the Yamal and Sakhalin 
peninsulas. This will bring the Russian Federation under increased pressure to 
open up its energy markets and allow foreign multinationals access to its 
upstream energy market. Political considerations would have to play a much 
lesser role in energy co-operation given the extent of interdependencies. After 
the 2009 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos such a profound 
overhaul of stance does not appear likely in the immediate outlook. There 
China and Russia criticized the current global financial system, putting the 
blame squarely on the US for poor quality regulation, as well as excess 
dependency on what is fundamentally the only base reserve currency. 
Resource-rich states have further weighed in the debate by blaming the stalled 
economic growth for falling energy prices. In their view, prices below USD 60-
80 make production unsustainable. The overall sense of the summit emerged as 
one of bitterness and blame. In turn this means that energy mapping will 
continue to be a strongly politicized issue.  
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Such realities dictate that the process of supranational energy co-operation can 
be facilitated only by rational actor-building coalitions. This is supported by 
Germany and Italy in the main, the EU’s largest importers of gas from OAO 
Gazprom. The level of co-operation that the EU is seeking at present is 
comparable to the level of co-operation that the six founding members of the 
ECSC have sought in the immediate post-war period. Yet, given the fact that 
the majority of fossil fuel resources lay outside the geographic boundaries of 
the EU, the task at hand is far more complex and sophisticated. In the new 
millennium two exogenous factors will be the primary determinants on the EU 
energy policy over and above the individual interests of member states, 
namely: (1) the wider geo-politics and (2) state interdependence within a 
globalised world. In turn, this requires a re-focusing of the priorities of the 
Commission further afield towards upstream (exploration) and mid-stream 
(refineries) investment. This necessitates a significant budgetary contribution to 
be set aside for European energy projects that does not currently exist. It would 
allow the EU to become present where the Russian Federation and the USA 
already are, namely in the Caspian Basin and the Middle East where over 70% 
of total world proven oil and gas resources lie. The EU is already quite late on 
its involvement in the region. However, the possibility to build up transmission 
networks in SEE and to expand its use of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from 
North Africa and Nigeria means that the EU is well placed to secure a 
significant measure of energy diversification in the short-to-medium term.  
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4. Diversification to the Caspian and beyond 
The traditional method of energy planning focuses on finding the least-cost 
generating alternative or ‘least cost versus portfolio-based approaches’ (EIB, 
2007). This stands justified only while technological progress occurs at low 
rates and energy prices are stable. Neither of these two preconditions is present 
today, which is why a shift away from the traditional view becomes necessary.  
One solution in this respect was proposed by the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) that is to do away with emphasis on evaluating alternative technologies 
(e.g., for renewables), instead focusing on the evaluation of alternative 
electricity generating portfolios and strategies (i.e., improving the production 
and use of existing sources). Support for this argument is found in the fact that 
whilst increasing the share of renewables within the EU-27 total energy mix is 
imperative, they still account for only 7-8% of the final energy consumption 
needs of the member states. Projected growth shows a doubling of these levels 
by 2030 but this will be still insufficient to meet rising energy consumption 
needs. Therefore, a final solution in this respect is still a long way in the offing.  
Instead, it is much more commensurate to use diversified generating portfolios 
with known (anticipated) risk levels that respond to objective energy generating 
costs. That includes techniques that can minimize a society’s energy cost and 
the energy price risk it faces. Primarily, this is an approach that in addition to 
straightforward mathematical models, such as the Shapley Value, takes into 
account those factors that offset the security of energy supply, such as 
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geopolitics and state interdependence. The European Investment Bank qualifies 
the merit of this approach in the following way: “Energy security is reduced 
when countries (and individual firms) hold inefficient portfolios that are 
needlessly exposed to the volatile fossil fuel cost risk” (EIB, 2007). By 
factoring in geo-politics and state interdependence in this approach, the paper 
proposes two perspectives for energy security of supply: (1) the political 
viewpoint that endorses the position that stable supply is paramount to occur at 
affordable prices regardless of the particular circumstances; (2) the economic 
viewpoint, namely that the efficiency of providing energy to consumers is the 
leading perspective in energy security.  
The two perspectives clearly cannot be combined as they are by their very 
nature conflicting. However, the solution to the discrepancy between the 
perspectives, as well as that contained in the main portfolio theory-based 
approach, is that diversification of the origin of supply is the only way to 
reduce the EU-27 predominant dependency on gas imports from OAO 
Gazprom. This diversification cannot occur through the northern dimension of 
the EU energy supply pipeline networks, as this can bring in gas only from 
Russian fields. However, the southern dimension of the gas pipeline networks 
is vital to the attainment of the overarching EU objective in energy policy, that 
diversification in the origin of supply, not least because over 70% of proven 
gas and oil reserves lie in Turkey’s immediate vicinity. A detailed examination 
of the pipeline networks in the region is especially relevant today where there 
exists a clear trend towards a widening of the share of natural gas consumption 
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within the EU-27 in the medium-to-long term. This can only increase 
dependency of the EU on gas imports from the Russian Federation at 
uncompetitive price levels. If the situation does not change, then it will sustain 
the lack of reciprocal obligation to OAO Gazprom that whilst it participates in 
the EU-27 energy market and benefits from access to its trading floor, EU 
companies ought to be entitled to similar access to the Russian market.  
The southern dimension of gas pipeline networks is characterized by a series of 
existing pipelines, pipelines under construction, and proposed such. The 
coalitions of players are much more diverse than in the EU northern energy 
dimension. The key players amongst the transmission states are Greece, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey. In different coalitions they can potentially transmit 
Russian gas, gas from the Caspian Basin, Iran and Iraq. However, a number of 
obstacles to advance diversification already exist.  
At present OAO Gazprom supplies the EU not only with its own indigenous 
resources but also with gas from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. It 
has a contractual relationship with the state-controlled gas companies of these 
countries who lack the infrastructure to transmit gas to the EU market. Major 
developed fields in the littoral states of the Caspian Basin are known to be the 
Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan (the only in receipt of adequate foreign investments, 
too) and the Ustyurt region in Kazakhstan. Offshore exploration, as well as the 
use of the Caspian Basin for transnational projects is extremely problematic 
because of the disputed legal status of the Caspian (whether a sea or a lake). In 
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addition, it is only the Russian Federation and Iran that have a bilateral 
agreement dating back to the times of the Soviet Union that divides the below 
the sea bed resources and the surface area of the Caspian. A veto from any one 
of the two states sends a project in disarray, as seen in the case of the Trans-
Caspian Gas Pipeline. Still today, the Caspian lacks a resolution on its legal 
regime between the five of its littoral states, some calling for a condominium 
(Iran), whist others prefer bi- and tri-lateral agreements (Russia, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan), blocking many initiatives and advances to explore the Caspian 
resources for energy. 
Notwithstanding, the gas reserves of the Caspian may in time become the 
subject of further revisions similar to the ones incurred in respect of its oil 
reserves, initially thought to be as abundant as the combined reserves of UAE 
and Kuwait but subsequently revised to 50-70 bn barrels “Yet to Find” (ytf), 
representing ca. 3% of global future oil supply. More sophisticated technology, 
as well as greater third-party access to the region can establish a more accurate 
picture of our understanding of potential recoverable reserves of fossil fuels. 
Natural gas supplies are thought to be more significant than oil reserves, 
standing at ca. 232 trillion cubic feet (IEA, 2006). Current estimates of proven 
gas reserves in the littoral states of the Caspian Basin place it in fourth position 
world-wide, which emphasizes the significance of the resource for the EU 
member states, as shown in Figure 1, as well as the influence they yield to the 
‘Caspian five’ in diplomatic overtures on matters as wide-ranging as economics 
and security in the region and beyond. 
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Figure 1: Proven Gas Reserves in the Caspian Basin, Tcf 
 
Source: IEA, 2006. 
 
Table 3: Caspian Sea Region Gas Reserves, tcf 
Country Proven Gas 
Reserves 
Possible Gas 
Reserves 
Total Gas 
Reserves 
Azerbaijan 11 35 46 
Iran 0 11 11 
Kazakhstan 53-83 88 141-171 
Russia NA NA NA 
Turkmenistan 98-155 159 257-314 
Uzbekistan 74-88 35 109-123 
Total 236-337 328 564-665 
Source: Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, USA, 2000. 
 
Azerbaijan, from which the EU currently receives gas along the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzerum pipeline that feeds supplies into the Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnector, is believed to have the least amount of gas reserves from 
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amongst the littoral states of the Caspian Basin with the exception of Iran. The 
small amounts of gas found in Azerbaijan explains importantly why the EU has 
been unable to commence work on its strategic project, Nabucco, as the flow of 
the 31 bcma maximum gas capacity of this pipeline has not been secured yet. 
This is accounted for by a high degree of caution on the part of the Caspian 
states, which are mindful of upsetting their relationship with the Russian 
Federation given their dominant dependence on it for exports of oil and gas 
from the region. Furthermore, the lower the price of gas, the less justified the 
exorbitant cost of pipeline construction. The construction cost of Nabucco 
started at EUR 4.6 billion rising through to EUR 7.9 billion in the most recent 
estimates. Despite the dramatic decrease in metals prices, a downward revision 
from this latest cost projections has not occurred. The EU is mindful to operate 
a project as unviable as Blue Stream is for OAO Gazprom, since it cannot 
justify the sunken costs to the EU taxpayer. But whilst the Russian Federation 
may be willing to absorb the construction costs for South Stream (estimated at 
EUR 15 billion to share between OAO Gazprom and ENI spa), in the EU the 
bulk of the investment will come from the private sector’s own accruals and 
therefore, it will have to be repaid over a reasonable period of time.  
The sum of this is that given the expense accompanying the development of 
new fields and the time it takes for both investment to come in and exploration 
to reap fruits, any gas diverted from the littoral states of the Caspian Basin 
directly towards the EU markets is likely to harm the quantities supplied from 
those states to OAO Gazprom under existing long-term contracts. Therefore, 
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logic dictates that in a perspective to 2030 the EU is still likely to receive the 
same quantities of gas as today, regardless of any possible diversification of 
supply if it is to occur from currently existing capabilities in the Caspian Basin. 
The only way to overcome this is either for the EU to make a concrete 
substantial investment commitment towards upstream exploration in those 
states, as well as to the construction of gas pipelines in SEE, which it does not 
at present, or look further afield towards Iraq and Iran where to mediate an 
agreement to supply EU markets with significant quantities of oil and gas. In 
the current political climate with individual EU member states unable to agree 
on a common position, the fostering of such an agreement seems unlikely. A 
still further option is to partake in intensive efforts towards the development of 
natural gas fields in Kazakhstan, the resources of which are still 
underdeveloped. Likewise, this would have to be accompanied by a financial 
commitment by the EU towards the construction of gas pipelines that can 
connect the fields to the EU markets. Yet, this would be increasingly difficult 
as it would necessitate the EU coming onto a field already occupied by the 
Americans and the Russians in the wider context of geo-politics. 
 
5. South-East Europe and regional co-operation 
Potentially, any diversification through the Caspian and Asia Minor is possible 
with transmission only through SEE. Given the lack of viable options for the 
diversification of the EU energy supply resources, fostering regional co-
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operation in the EU south-eastern dimension can provide a potential venue to 
open up the Union to unexplored but strategic opportunities to pursue its 
energy objectives. Projects in SEE decrease the negative effects of distance, as 
well as those of further externalities, such as transit costs. In this section we 
consider the cases of Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey as the principal actors in 
this scenario. 
5.1. Greece 
The need for Greece to diversify its natural gas imports is in the first instance 
due to the widening share of gas consumption in the state, where gas was first 
introduced in the energy mix only in 1997. Since then, Greece has launched 
concrete projects to receive Azeri gas through the Turkey-Greece 
Interconnector (TGI), part of a wider project, ITGI, to be extended under the 
Adriatic Sea to Otranto in Italy in order to supply between 12 bcma and a 
maximum of 18 bcma of gas to the EU. Although still representing only a small 
quantity of total EU gas consumption, it is an important milestone in the EU 
policy of diversification as the pipeline bypasses Russian territory and does not 
carry OAO Gazprom gas.4 
While Greece diversifies its energy supply, it is also keen to guarantee the 
security of supply. Soon after the inauguration of the TGI, Turkey tapped 
supplies to Greece in order to pressure Azerbaijan into delivering greater 
quantities of gas through the BTC pipeline. Therefore, dominant considerations 
                                                 
4
 Estimated at 19,710 peta joule (PJ), or 505 billion cubic metres (BCM), or 424 
million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) (Eurogas, 2008). 
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of security led Greece to join the OAO Gazprom/ENI spa-led South Stream 
project in the summer of 2008. It has a number of strategic underpinnings, 
amongst which the cementing of the focal position that the Russian Federation 
plays in the EU energy market. For Greece and the EU the role of this project 
counterbalances fears of Turkey’s natural expansion as an energy transmission 
hub. One concern is Turkey’s open desire to re-sell gas to EU markets, whereas 
the principle is that a buyer is prohibited from re-selling gas purchased under 
contract to buyers in a different country. Inter alias the execution of the EU 
strategic project of Nabucco has been delayed, amongst other reasons, also 
because Turkey continues to explore opportunities to trade gas from the share 
of its allocation of total pipeline flow capacity. 
With a dense national gas transmission grid and key strategic gas projects 
spanning its territory, such as the BTC and Blue Stream, as well as connections 
to Tabriz (Iran) and Kirkuk (Iraq), the EU comes under increased pressure to 
acquiesce Turkey’s EU membership ambitions in exchange for the 
advancement of diversification projects through its territory, such as the 
strongly US-backed Nabucco gas pipeline. Turkey’s position is further 
strategically strengthened by its key port city of Ceyhan, through which Turkey 
has positioned itself for natural resources transit to Syria, Lebanon and Israel 
(Ceyhan-Haifa), as well as Northern Cyprus (a sea-bed pipeline). Finally, 
Turkey has undertaken significant efforts towards the construction of gas 
storage facilities, such as at the lake district of Tuz Golu, the largest of its kind 
in the region. This sends a strong signal that Turkey will continue to pile up 
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stocks and use those at stock peak times at a premium, increasing its diplomatic 
clout.  
Therefore, Greece has come in this very competitive field at an important 
juncture for EU energy policy development to help level the playing field with 
strong investments and a strategic long-term outlook for the region. In addition 
to the proposed projects that Greece has joined in, there are also negotiations to 
increase current levels of gas imports from OAO Gazprom (received from 
Bulgaria at the Kulata) and intensified efforts to extend the national gas 
transmission grid, as well as transmission pipeline networks to the countries of 
the Western Balkans, thus propelling Greece into a position as a major leader in 
gas transmission in SEE. 
5.2. Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian gas market is controlled by the state-owned Bulgargaz company, 
part of the Bulgargaz Holding Company, which retains the only gas license for 
import and distribution of gas in the country. Historically, Bulgaria has been a 
net export country of Russian-supplied natural gas, primarily to its neighbours 
of Greece, Turkey, as well as the states of the Western Balkans. Whereas 
Greece has successfully began to diversify its gas import mix through the 
import of Algerian LNG, as well as Caspian gas through Turkey, Bulgaria still 
maintains 100% import dependency of natural gas from OAO Gazprom.  
Since becoming a member of NATO in 2004 and of the European Union in 
2007, Bulgaria has finally commenced a programme that when completed 
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would result in the diversification of the origin of the supply of natural gas in 
the country. As a result, Bulgaria has become a key transmission state both in 
the proposed Nabucco project and within South Stream (at least for the time 
being, given Russia’s attempt to play the country’s port of Varna up against the 
Romanian port of Constanza that decreases sea-bed pipeline length by some 
100 km but critically pressures the countries to succumb to OAO Gazprom 
demands of ownership of the pipelines crossing what is now essentially EU 
territory). Bulgaria has also been instrumental in the increased amounts of gas 
flowing from the Trans-Balkan pipeline to Turkey and potentially also to 
Greece, through a meter upgrade at its border. Bulgaria had a competitive 
advantage in SEE for many years through its gas storage facility in the region 
of the Chiren gas field. Pressured by competition from Turkey and Greece, it is 
currently in undertakings to construct a second gas storage facility at the Galata 
gas field through a licensing agreement to Melrose Resources Plc of the UK. 
Bulgaria has, therefore, in the course of the past few years renewed attempts to 
become a key gas transmission state in SEE. 
5.3. Turkey 
Turkey posses the geographic advantage to lie in the immediate vicinity of over 
70% of the world’s proven gas and oil reserves.5 Given that the transmission of 
the resources is as important as their exploration, Turkey’s role as an energy 
bridge between Europe and the Middle East can never be understated. After 
                                                 
5
 65.3% of proven oil reserves lie in the Middle East (BP Amoco Statistical Review of 
World Energy, June 2001, p. 4); Over 70% of proven gas reserves lie in Eurasia 
(Russia, the CIS and Middle East) (DG Energy and Transport, 2007/8). 
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Germany, Turkey is the second largest importer of gas from OAO Gazprom on 
par with Italy at over 23 bcma. Therefore, Turkey’s vested interest in 
diversifying its dependency in order to decrease soaring energy prices and 
ensure further significant state revenues from transit payments. Table 4 
presents a summary of all major gas transmission projects to span its territory 
(in operation and proposed). All of these are directly relevant to EU needs for 
diversification.  
Table 4: Natural Gas Pipeline Projects in Turkey, Bcf/y 
Project Status Length (miles) 
Max. capacity 
(Bcf/y) 
Blue Stream In operation 750 565 
Iran-Turkey Pipeline In operation 750 495 
South Caucasus 
Pipeline Under construction 430 700 
TGI Under construction 186 407 
Nabucco Proposed 2,050 460-1,100 
Egypt-Turkey 
Pipeline Proposed NA NA 
Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline Suspended/Cancelled 1,050 565 
Source: EIA/US, 2006. 
 
Beyond the state-centric consideration, Turkey has become especially keen in 
the post-Cold War era to play the role of mediator amongst the littoral states of 
the Caspian Basin, thus expanding its diplomatic leverage in its immediate 
vicinity. This has led to substantial investments in Georgia, in large part to 
support what it considers a Turkish minority in the state. Most recently, an 
attempt at rapprochement has been made vis-à-vis Armenia too, paving the way 
for Turkey to mitigate any possible future resolution over the latent 1994 
military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the autonomous region of 
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Nagorny Karabakh. The importance of these efforts cannot be downplayed 
given the insurgencies in 2008 in South Ossetia (and potentially Abhazia) in 
Georgia, closing off the sea ports of Poti and Batumi, jeopardizing the delivery 
of oil exports to the European markets. In light of such developments, Turkey 
has undertaken an ambitious investment and construction programme, headed 
by the state-controlled gas operator, Botaş. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Regional co-operation is defined as policy co-operation in different decision-
making areas between geographically proximate neighbours. The goal is to 
manage linkages, as well as create new such by being pro-active. The major 
debate in regionalism within the EU is one of widening versus deepening of 
integration, or one of the benefits of variable geometry. Therefore, in respect of 
this research the question is whether EU energy policy would be better served 
if the states of SEE advance their co-operation in energy transmission to cater 
for EU policy deficiencies in upstream and midstream energy exploration. 
The three main players of the region, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey already 
have a platform of rapidly growing trade relations on which to build up the 
process of energy co-operation. The undisputed regional leader in trade in SEE 
is Greece, having invested by 2003 already over EUR 3 billion in the transition 
states. Amongst the investors are Hellenic Petroleum, OTE, Alpha Bank, the 
National Bank of Greece, the Commercial Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, 
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Delta Dairy, Titan Cement, Leventis, and Viohalco, to mention but a few. So 
much so that Greek President Papoulias declared 2007 the ‘golden age’ in 
regional trade relations.  
Major forums for regional co-operation amongst the states of SEE include the 
Inter-Balkan Cooperation, as well as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC), amongst a number of others. These two, in particular, provide a 
platform for future energy co-operation amongst the states of SEE. The South-
East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was taken up by Greece and 
Bulgaria to revive regional cooperation at the summit meeting in Crete in 
November 1997. Given that the problems of the Balkans can be more 
effectively dealt with by the Balkan countries themselves and by the peoples of 
the region, the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) is a useful 
tool for regional cooperation, which could be upgraded to become an organised 
institution for the Balkans. There is also close coordination between the three 
countries within the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation. Greece 
attaches particular importance to this regional formation, which is crucial to 
promoting economic development and stability in the participating states and 
the wider region, more generally.  
In 2008 Greece continued to be the third largest foreign investor in Bulgaria, 
closely following on Austria and Germany. Likewise, Greece is the fourth 
biggest investor in Turkey with FDI from Greece totalling over USD 2.8 billion 
for the period 2002-2006, which adds to a growth of 114% in total trade 
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volumes over the same period. Bulgaria-Turkey trade volumes have reached 
USD 4 billion in 2007, expected to rise to USD 10 billion in the short-to-
medium term with exponential growth of USD 1 billion each year in the period 
2005-2008. Needless to say, the EU enlargement policy in the region has made 
SEE one of the most dynamic and important developing markets in the EU. 
The importance that energy has assumed in the past decade for the EU member 
states and beyond means that instead of competing with each other, the states 
can benefit better from co-operating with one another. Both trade and energy 
transmission has an in-built logic of collaboration with neighbouring states in 
order to maximise profits from activities. Therefore, supporters of a multi-
speed approach to European integration stand to acknowledge the greater 
benefits that can be reaped through regional co-operation in energy as opposed 
to from supranational EU energy policy-making alone. 
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